Confused? A Hormuz War Aide Memoire for Mariners
The maritime community know the Gulf well. But when mixed in with the political system in Iran, which is sophisticated but opaque and very different to a Western-style democracy, plus the unorthodox approach adopted by President Trump, it is easy to get confused. Herewith is a summary to set matters in context.
Iranian objectives: The Iranian clerical regime’s long-term strategy is a mix of religious and Persian nationalist objectives, aiming to establish Shi’a Iran as the dominant regional power in the Middle East. This is a long-term strategy and the Iranians are patient, so the short-term objective of the regime is to somehow survive the current war – and then, post-recovery, to resume the march towards regional domination. Iran sees itself as a global power.
Israeli objectives: Israel's aim is to change the regime which espouses Iran’s expansionist strategy (see above), neutralizing the nuclear and ballistic missile threat and ending Iranian support for hostile proxy forces which threaten Israel from neighboring countries. Free access through the Strait of Hormuz is a “nice to have,” not fundamental.
US objectives: American war aims parallel Israel’s. Keeping the Strait open and running is a Central Command objective, but President Trump is less consistent. However, if the US-initiated war results in a loss of free access through the Strait, then the economic model of some Gulf states could be fatally threatened; it could have major repercussions for the United States’ global standing, or provoke a wider war.
The Iranian Political System: Differences of opinion within the Iranian governing regime are nothing new. Iranian politics operates in a very sophisticated manner – often not recognized in the West because it is not the familiar liberal democratic system but one governed by Vel?yat-e Faq?h (roughly equal to “religious oversight”). To illustrate, Iranian elections have a huge franchise, far bigger than in any GCC state. There are strong disagreements and plenty of political horse-trading between Iranian political factions, but it all takes place ‘within the tent’ to which only those vetted by the religious Expediency Council are admitted. As the Iranian electorate knows full well, ‘reformist’ is a relative term: reformists have been allowed into the tent, and generally have the same aims as the IRGC-dominated hardliners, but want to attain these goals in a less aggressive fashion.
Iranian Political Survival and Stability: Notwithstanding the decapitation of the Iranian leadership, Iranian governance has survived. Although the IRGC and Paydari Party hardliners now dominate the reformists to an even greater degree than before, it is significant that the 70-strong delegation which attended the first negotiation in Islamabad was far bigger than needed for the negotiation itself, bulked up of representatives of all factions exploiting the safety of the truce to thrash out disagreements which otherwise would have been addressed in the parliament in Tehran. On the streets, the edifice of Velayat-e Faqih religious rule has been shaken but there has been no uprising, largely because the regime has demonstrated it will be utterly ruthless in quelling any dissent.
The US Campaign: Damage inflicted by Israeli and US air attacks on military and senior political targets will take years to recover from. These attacks have not flushed out destabilizing pressures on the political leadership. Such pressure is far more likely to be initiated by economic hardships generated by the blockade, or if infrastructure is damaged impacting essential services. There is significant latent unhappiness with the regime for bringing all these problems down on ordinary Iranians.
The Negotiations: The Iranian will have great difficulty bridging the gaps between their own political factions and coming up with an agreed negotiation plan. This may delay their arrival at the negotiating table. Normally, the Iranians are skilled negotiators, luring the opposition forward with hints of compromise while finally conceding very little, and also unafraid to employ taqiyya, the Iranian concept of religiously-justified deception. Taqiyya is likely to be less of a problem in the forthcoming negotiations than the sheer difficulty of coming up with an agreed position internally. Different Iranian groupings will say different things, confusing the media more used to Western-style politics.
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The Strait of Hormuz: The Iranians will be able to keep the Strait closed with minimal military capability: a pair of AK47-armed IRGC soldiers in a speedboat, a suggestion that mines have been laid plus an occasional drone strike might suffice to do the job, albeit Central Command under a particularly effective naval commander may have a cunning plan. Reflecting the political contest between different factions, there is likely to be a lack of coordination amongst Iranian forces covering the Strait; masters know that merchant vessels need clearance on Channel 16 from the regular navy, the IRGC Navy and the coastguard before proceeding, and sometimes receive different advisories. Oman will seek support for maintaining the current IMO-endorsed toll-free Traffic Separation Scheme, which is largely channeled through Omani territorial waters.
A Forecast: Any long-term forecast of how matters will be resolved in the Gulf is unlikely to remain valid for very long. President Trump, in a desire to wrap things up, may be willing to compromise. But neither Iran, nor the whole of Asia plus the Gulf States and finally the American political establishment, are likely to allow him to do so if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened. This will likely end up as the most contentious issue, potentially unsolvable in current circumstances, if talks do finally get underway in Islamabad.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.